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Abstract—In recent years, many new and interesting models
of successful online business have been developed. Many of
these are based on the competition between users, such as
online auctions, where the product price is not fixed and tends
to rise. Other models, including group-buying, are based on
cooperation between users, characterized by a dynamic price
of the product that tends to go down. There is not yet a
business model in which both sellers and buyers are grouped in
order to negotiate on a specific product or service. The present
study investigates a new extension of the group-buying model,
called fair, which allows aggregation of demand and supply for
price optimization, in a cooperative manner. Additionally, our
system also aggregates products and destinations for shipping
optimization. We introduced the following new relevant input
parameters in order to implement a double-side aggregation:
(a) price-quantity curves provided by the seller; (b) waiting time,
that is, the longer buyers wait, the greater discount they get;
(c) payment time, which determines if the buyer pays before,
during or after receiving the product; (d) the distance between
the place where products are available and the place of shipment,
provided in advance by the buyer or dynamically suggested by
the system. To analyze the proposed model we implemented a
system prototype and a simulator that allow to study effects
of changing some input parameters. We analyzed the dynamic
price model in fairs having one single seller and a combination
of selected sellers. The results are very encouraging and motivate
further investigation on this topic.
Index Terms—auction, aggregation, fair, group buying, social
buying
I. INTRODUCTION
IN recent years, the expansion of e-commerce services hasled to the creation of new Internet based business models,
including auctions and group buying.
Online auctions is becoming very popular both in
business-to-business (B2B) and in consumer markets. Unlike
fixed prices mechanisms (FPMs), which dominated pricing
strategies in last decades, online auctions introduce dynamic
pricing mechanisms (DPMs) where buyers also dynamically
influence the sale price. English and Vickrey auctions are the
most popular on the Internet, but several different auction
schemes exist, some have just appeared recently. The most
popular online auction site, eBay, adopts English auctions,
but allows suppliers to set a limit to the highest price can be
offered for the object. The price decision mechanism can even
be fully assigned to buyers, as it happens in Priceline.com.
First, buyers propose their own price for flight tickets and
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hotel rooms; then, sellers decide whether to accept such prices,
based on demand and asset availability.
Recently, also Group Buying (GB) business models
appeared on the Internet: buyers cluster in groups to obtain
discounts on purchasing products and services. In some cases,
this works under the condition that a minimum number of
requested items, otherwise potential buyers cannot finalize
the purchase. GB permits single buyers to get discounts
that are normally available only to wholesalers. Products are
displayed on the web site during a time frame, typically called
auction cycle. As more buyers join the group, unit price drops
down, according to price / quantity function, predetermined
by sellers. This can be explicitly revealed to potential buyers
or be withheld.
Unit price decreasing model is applied not only in group
buying, where the demand is aggregated upon several buyers,
but also when a single buyer requests more than one object. A
typical price trajectory is reported in Fig. 1, where unit price
goes down with demanded quantity, accordingly to ’the more
you buy, the more you save’ principle. Prices move on discrete
price levels: from 1 to 9, it is 4.69 e, between 10 and 29, it
is 4.19 e, from 30 to 59 falls to 3.69 eand finally it remains
3.09 efor higher demands.
A similar pricing trajectory was found on MobShop.com, a
pioneer group buying, during an auction cycle [1]. Mobshop
was one of several group-buying sites appeared in the US
and European markets in the early 2000s, together with
Mercata, CoShopper, and LetsBuyIt. Despite the brilliant idea
of grouping buyers, alone it was not enough to survive
the market. In facts, all these platforms closed their doors
after short time, for bankruptcy or insufficient gains. A deep
analysis on the causes of these failures is out of the scope
of this paper, however, a common factor was the incapability
to capture great discounts and the limited range of product
availability1.
Concepts of volume-based discounts and grouping still
survive, but recently reappeared in different clothes. These
two aspects reside in contemporary portals: the volume-based
discounts is behind the price policy in staples.it, the demand
aggregation lays behind groupon.com. Groupon uses a fixed
price mechanism and does not allow flexibility in the choice
of offered product, that instead is proposed by the platform.
One item is displayed for 24 h as deal-of-the-day, with a high
discount rate, even more than 50%. If the minimum number of
1Further details on these failures are available on online news
of the epoch: http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB97951268061999104,
http://www.cnet.com/news/group-buying-site-mercata-to-shut-its-doors/
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Fig. 1: Price trajectory of the unit price of a stack of paper at
Staples MondOffice
buyers is reached by 24 h, they receive a redeemable coupon,
and the price is debited to their credit cards.
The key aspect, that is surprisingly understudied, regards
the availability of products, the possibility of aggregating both
buyers and sellers and how this impacts on the unit price.
We deliberately focus on such relevant issue and propose a
double-side aggregation that, at the best of our knowledge, is
the first methodology which simultaneously take into account
buyers and sellers. Our first contribution is the definition of
fairs as key opportunities to aggregate buyers and sellers
around desired products and services, providing the best
trade-off among contrasting aspects. A second contribution
lays on the definition of a general architecture for fair-based
e-commerce. These contributions are organized in the present
paper as follows.
First, we provide an overview about related work on
e-commerce models, in section II. Then, our novel fair-based
model and the whole reference architecture are presented,
respectively, in sections III and IV. We validated our model
implementing a prototype, described in section V. Two
possible use-cases are reported in section VI, demonstrating
benefits of demand and supply aggregation using fairs for
products and services. We show numerical results about
dynamic pricing due to sellers aggregation in section VII, and
how they impact on the whole aggregation of buyers. Finally,
we draw conclusions in VIII, illustrating also directions for
future work about fairs.
II. RELATED WORK
Several studies have explored the online GB phenomenon.
The DPM used at the GB sites was compared with the
traditional FPM. In some cases it was found that the DPM
is equivalent to optimal FPM [2], [3]. Further results show
that the DPM used in GB has better performance than FPM
in four scenarios.
The first scenario is under uncertain demand regime [2],
[4]. Merchants can set non-linear price-quantity schedules
that optimize revenues under each demand regime. As
better discussed later, our system fits the uncertain demand
regime, because it leverages aggregation according to several
parameters, including waiting time, payment time, expected
savings, etc.
The second scenario concerns production postponement in
combining economies of scale [2], [3]. This situation emerges
when production can be tailored to satisfy the revealed
demand information, and economies of scale allow the optimal
exploitation of any information that outperforms the FPM.
This also holds in our case, we have flexibility in time and
therefore production can be tailored to the product request.
In the third scenario, sellers are risk-seekers who want to
expand in a market with new products. Risk-seeking merchants
desire to sell higher volumes of products, even facing lower
unit prices. This permits to attract more buyers which are
price-driven.
The fourth scenario entails the presence of a greater
low-valuation demand than a high-valuation demand [5].
Hence, fewer buyers purchase at a higher price, and more
buyers exist when the price is lower. In this manner, a seller
can gain more benefits by adopting the GB mechanism.
Although these studies provide merchants the tools to get
the optimal price curve for GB, they remain theoretical and
mainly based on simulations.
Buyers’ demand is aggregated during a waiting time, which
influences GB performances. Effects of waiting time on the
financial return are studied in [6], according a novel empirical
analysis of GB mechanisms. This work clearly demonstrates
the presence of a trade-off between different performance
factors.
Several studies explored group formation mechanism
through simulation analysis and modeling. The earliest GB
websites faced difficulties aggregating a sufficient number of
buyers with similar purchasing interests [1], [7]. Afterwards,
different strategies were used to improve grouping and in [8]
it was proposed to arrange buyers in different GB websites.
Authors of [9] introduce the concept of Combinatorial
Coalition Formation (CCF), which allows buyers to announce
reserve prices for combinations of products. These reserve
prices, along with the sellers’ price / quantity curves for each
product, are used to determine the formation of GB for each
product.
In [10], [11] it was proposed the use of a decision
support system based on buyer preferences. A volume discount
mechanism based on the seller’s reservation price and the
payment adjustment value was the approach used in [12]. GB
was proposed also for a whole category of products instead a
single one [13] and buyers’ web browsing history was used to
recommend GB products [14].
In addition to consumers grouping, also cooperation
mechanisms for sellers have appeared in literature. A
cooperation mechanism among sellers based on exchanging
goods in an agent-mediated electronic market system [15],
[16]. To obtain a higher GB success rate, pricing agents
recommend to sellers adequate prices, based on the past buying
and selling history data [17]. Even security has been taken into
account and a mechanism for mitigating security risks during
GB transactions was proposed in [18]. The authors introduce
of a mediator GB server to secure and monitor transactions.
This helps buyers and sellers to negotiate through a secure
channel.
Some studies also investigated the effect that GB mechanism
produces on buyers’ behavior. Potential buyers are influenced
more by their friends than by marketers [19]. In our model
buyers can have shopping interactions through existing social
media, so they can share information about products or
services.
In their analysis about the MobShop website, interesting
effects were observed [1]. Consumers purchase more in:
large-sized groups (positive reinforcement participation); close
to the time when prices drop (price drop effect), when the end
of an auction cycle is approaching (cycle-ending effect).
To take advantage of positive participation three incentive
mechanisms where suggested, based on time, quantity and
sequence [20], [21]. A time-based incentive mechanism can
be used to encourage buyers to join the GB auction in its
early days by offering an extra participation discount. So the
earlier a buyer joins, the higher will be the offered discount. A
quantity-based incentive mechanism helps stimulating buyers
to purchase more than planned offering extra discounts on
the size of a single order. With a sequence-based incentive
mechanism, the buyers’ times of arrival in the system are
compared and discount depends on the sequence of arrivals.
The earlier you join, the less you pay.
However, as already mentioned in section I, most of earlier
GB websites have terminated operations. An analysis of
this early failures is reported in [7], attributing them to:
(1) long GB auction cycles, that hindered buying decision;
(2) complex GB models, as perceived by buyers; (3) low
transaction volumes, determining small discounts for buyers.
It was difficult for earlier GB websites to compete with large
retailers from a price perspective.
As discussed in following sections, our model overcomes
such negative aspects by introducing: aggregation of both
demand and supply for price formation, aggregation of
products and destinations for shipping optimization, price
prediction, integration (rather than direct competition) with
large e-commerce platforms.
III. THE FAIR AGGREGATION MODEL
We propose the definition of a new business model in which
both sellers and buyers aggregate for negotiating products
or service: fairs. In their traditional standard form, fairs
are organized as gatherings for selling goods, sometimes as
exhibitions. Fairs include timing concepts (being periodically
held), customer aggregation (people meet to discuss about
their shopping goals), seller aggregation (sellers mount their
booths close each other to permit better product comparison)
and amusement, since they provide entertainment. All these
aspects, and even more, are maintained in our fairs, whose
architecture is composed by several elements and parameters,
centered on aggregation.
Analogously to standard fairs, which use limited geographic
areas to display goods, our fairs provide an aggregated supply
coming from multiple sellers in a reduced virtual area (one
single platform). This increments the attraction mass for
potential buyers, because they can look for a wider range of
products, services, and sellers as well as their comparison and
review (our system integrates with existing social networks).
Furthermore, our system hides the complex optimization
procedures behind the optimized unit price quest to buyers,
which go through a very simple workflow.
Fairs work like product-oriented social communities that
aggregate demands at the buyer side and offers at the seller
side, with new modalities in the online business world. Our
system is able to deal also with both goods and services. In
what follows, for the sake of simplicity, when we refer to
goods, buyers and sellers we implicitly include also services,
providers and customers.
Buyers’ orders are composed according to a large-scale
cooperative aggregation that takes into account buyers’
location (for better shipping aggregation) and shopping
interests (for advanced product selection).
The system aggregates orders depending on several
buyer-side requirements, including the maximum waiting time
and the expected discount. This basic concept is in common
with GB: the more products of the same kind are requested
in a single order, the more prices fall down due to scale
economy. However, unlike standard GB, we can offer better
prices even without registered sellers. This can be obtained
with our multiple-sided aggregation vision.
High-quantity orders can be achieved with large numbers
of participants to the fair. Buyers can join the fair requesting
a single item or even multiple ones. To obtain effective
aggregation goals, the system stimulates positive behaviors
by providing incentives in terms of applied discounts and
promoting social interactions.
Unlike GB, our fair-based e-commerce system also
aggregates sellers, looking for the best trade-off among
contrasting requirements at the seller and buyer sides: waiting
and payment time, price/quantity curves, volumes of available
goods and their positions, as well as shipping trajectories.
In our model, seller-side aggregation is both competitive and
cooperative. The competition among sellers is due to their need
to prevail in order to be selected by the system and be called
on supplying goods. Given the (dynamic) demand related to
the group of buyers in the fair, and given a list of sellers and
their supply conditions, our system dynamically orders sellers
by their quality index satisfying buyers’ requirements.
It may happen the aggregated demand of goods cannot be
satisfied by a single seller, for the time required. Solutions to
face such issues are described in section VI.
Under these circumstances, the demand of the whole fair is
partially satisfied by the best seller for that specific fair, then
by the second in the list, and so on till the order is completely
satisfied. Sellers aggregation is cooperative in the sense they
collaborate with the system to fulfill the whole supply, but no
inter-seller cooperation is neither requested,nor expected, as
competing sellers are not supposed to actively cooperate each
other.
Fairs are defined given a set of buyers, a set of sellers and
their requirements in terms of buying and selling conditions.
Fairs aggregate demand and supply of a given set of aggregated
buyers and sellers. Buyers spontaneously aggregate according
to their wished product or service, sellers are systematically
aggregated by the fair management system.
The system considers sellers that explicitly registered into
the system (so they provided extra information such as
price/quantity curves) and includes also those that offer the
requested product on integrated e-commerce portals such as
Amazon, e-Bay, and Groupon. In this case, the system acts as
a reseller.
IV. FAIR-BASED SYTEM ARCHITECTURE
Our modular system architecture is reported in fig. 2,
where several modules handle, configure and manage all actors
participating in our fairs.
The buyer manager module handles buyers since their
authentication into the system, dealing with their demands
and profiling. Sellers are handled by the seller manager,
which considers also price/volume curves, location of products
or where services can be consumed. The fair manager
is a key module that handles most of the fair workflow:
groups formation, DPM handling, seller(s) selection, payment
and shipment. This runs a fair management algorithm that
aggregates demands and supply, decides amount(s) paid to
seller(s) and how they must be shared between buyers. Even
if aggregated into the same fair, prices paid by buyers are,
in general, heterogeneous, because they are a function also of
buyers’ fidelity index.
In addition to modules, the middleware exposes open
interfaces to develop web-based and mobile applications
dedicated to buyers, sellers and platform managers. This API
permits to integrate our advanced aggregation capabilities into
third-parties applications. Our system is in the form of a
middleware, which relies on existing web services for social
interaction. Buyers interact on social media, rise the interest
about fairs and can involve other potential buyers.
Payments and shipping services are also externalized
to third parties. However, our middleware provides an
aggregation-based optimization that results transparent to these
parties. Such details are provided to shipment services hiding
the complex optimization. Products and destinations are also
aggregated, and the fair management module centrally decides
quantities, locations and shipping sources/destinations in
order to minimize shipping costs. Users only asynchronously
proceed with the final payment and shipping.
The fair algorithm provides also price predictions depending
on the number of aggregated buyers, thus the user at every
moment knows the requested amount for his purchase and
future amounts expected under successful aggregations. This
encourage buyers to be actively involved in the fair (e.g. by
invite their friends interested to the same product categories)
and periodically check the portal/application. This social
aspects of e-commerce may also have emotional value on
friendship and socialization [22].
Sellers no longer set one single price per product, but rather
provide a monotone non-increasing curve for price/quantities.
This could eventually have an horizontal asymptote depending
on production price.
Fairs end their lifecycle when the maximum time has
been reached or the optimal minimum price for the fair is
obtained. This optimal prices is defined in eq. 1 and in case
of multiple equivalent minima, the one corresponding to the
lowest aggregated volume is chosen.
z∗pi,γ(q) = min(zpi,γ(q)) (1)
Given price-quantity curves provided by vendors, given the
fair ending event as discussed above, the fair management
algorithm determines the quantities to be requested to each
seller in order to obtain the minimum unit price and satisfy
consumers’ demand.
A. Parameters
As already mentioned, the fair model introduces a novel
dimension for the trading concept: buyers and sellers are
aggregated according to (competing) parameters.
Significant parameters include quantity qpi,β,γ . This
indicates the amount of product pi requested by buyer β in
group (our fair) γ. Analogously qpi,σ,γ indicates the amount of
product pi requested to seller σ in the group γ. Additionally,
we consider Qpi,γ , as the availability of product pi at the seller
σ, therefore
∑
γ qpi,σ,γ ≤ Qpi,γ must hold for each seller,
considering all running fairs.
As for timing, tβ , is the waiting time before receiving the
product and depends on the fair duration and tσ is the payment
time, that takes care if the buyer pays before, during or after
receiving the product.
From the positioning point of view, our system keeps
position of products and the history of buyers’ positions,
respectively pβ = (xβ , yβ) and pσ = (xσ, yσ). Buyers
that ask for shipping in heterogeneous places, may obtain
benefits if they regularly attend common places. The system
correlates buyers’ positions and provides suggestions for
shipment aggregation. As for example, different buyers that
periodically attend the same place (e.g. school, office, etc.),
can receive their parcel when they go there. This permits to
obtain reducing shipping costs. Position of buyers is taken by
the mean of a simple positioning tool integrate into the web
service and mobile application.
Incentives are given to buyers and sellers depending on
their fidelity scores φβ and φσ . As for buyers, these depend
on their previous interaction with the system: the number of
purchases, payment time (the earlier the better), and number
of fair-related actions in social networks. Sellers are scored
accordingly to the shape of their price/quantity curve (in case
of registered sellers) and about the reliability of data they
provide (shipping time, availability, etc.).
As for prices, the unit price to be paid by the buyer β for
the product pi is zpi,β . Analogously the price requested by the
seller σ, for the same product, is zpi,σ . Demand and supply
meet in fairs with a unit price for product pi in the fair γ,
which is indicated as zpi,γ and can eventually differ from both
previously mentioned prices.
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Fig. 2: The fair-based system architecture and relevant relationships with external exhisting tools and frameworks.
Additionally, the fair manager business model, includes a
small revenue upon fairs that reached the end of their lifecycle.
The gain for the fair manager is the difference between the
two sums in eq. 2. ∑
β∈Bγ
zpi,β ≥
∑
σ∈Sγ
zpi,σ (2)
V. SYSTEM PROTOTYPE
We designed and implemented a first system prototype in
order to validate the feasibility of our proposed fair model
over a real e-commerce framework.
From the available open-source platforms, we analyzed
Zen Cart, OpenCart, and Magento. We finally selected
OpenCart [23], as a basis to implement our idea, because
of its integration with a large number of services offered
by third-parties. OpenCart is free open source ecommerce
platform for online merchants and it is available under the
GNU GPL. The software is written in PHP with a MySQL
database by default. OpenCart offers a number of features
permitting to deal with unlimited products, manufacturers and
multiple shops. Despite it comes with unlimited categories,
some extensions have been necessary to support services
rather than just products. The framework natively integrates
several payment systems and shipping methods, eventually
configurable for different geographic area, which is a key
functionality of the proposed architecture. The extensibility of
the system is due to its modularity and in a dedicated e-store
more than 9000 modules and themes are already available.
In our first prototype, we extended OpenCart functionalities
adding the following capabilities: (i) handling DPM by the
means of discount factors, as discussed in sect. IV-A; (ii)
pricing updates depend on both the requested quantity and
the product availability in stock. Prices, quantities, and other
relevant parameters have been implemented as multiplicative
factors; (iv) user’s position is taken and stored in the database,
for user profiling and shipping optimization, by the mean of
an Ajaxcall; (v) sellers provide their multi-dimensional pricing
strategies.
VI. USE CASES
Fig. 3 shows the UML use case diagram for a fair-based
system. Main system actors involved in a fair are buyers (or
customers) and sellers (or providers), as well as payment and
shipping services.
We describe the whole workflow for fair management by
the means of an example. Let’s consider having a buyer that
wants to buy a smartphone, which can be found online at a
price of 100 CUs. After logging into the system using private
credentials, buyers check if existing fairs are already running
about the desired object (category and model). If there is no
running fair for the demanded product, the buyer launches a
new one. Opening the fair, he describes the product category
and provides parameters about desired discount rate, time
Fig. 3: The UML use case diagram that shows the main functions of a fair-based system.
constraints, payment constraints. In case the desired product
is not available among those supplied by registered sellers,
the platform interrogates external e-commerce portals (e-bay,
groupon, amazon, etc.), in order to return anyway an answer to
the questing buyer. This avoids frustrating potential users with
lack of products, which can be probable during the starting
period, when the number of registered sellers and products is
not high. Of course, having no price/quantity curves available,
the only benefits would be those of shipping aggregation.
As for sellers, they access a dedicated section where they
define the price/quantity curve by providing its parameters
or through a table. When the fair goes to its end, all
buyers involved receive a notification and the final price is
communicated. Payment is requested to those buyers that
did not do it before. The system optimizes shipping services
after determining quantities to be requested to each seller and
computed the best shipping routing between sellers and buyers.
Fairs deal also with services and in this case we refer
to customers and providers. Entertainment services (tickets
for museums, cruise, flights, ...), health services (medical
treatments), and learning services (private lessons) can be
dealt with fairs. As for providers, extra aggregation models
are available, depending on the time the service is consumed.
Both sequential and concurrent aggregations are possible as
customers can use the service concurrently (e.g. in a cinema)
or in a sequential manner (e.g. scheduled wellness treatments
in a beauty farm).
VII. RESULTS
In this section we show results obtained by our aggregation
mechanism. Being aggregation at the buyer side extensively
covered in literature, we synthesize the aggregation at the
buyer-side with the aggregate number of demanded items, then
we focus on aggregation at the seller side.
To validate our aggregation methodology we used both the
system prototype described in sect. V and an ad-hoc simulator
written in Matlab, to test aggregation over a large number of
sellers and buyers.
A. Dynamic pricing model for the single seller
In fig. 4, the dynamic pricing models for single seller
are shown. Among the test campaign we run, we show
results using 20 sellers providing as many curves of unit
price/quantity, for the same good.
Our aggregation middleware supports whatever shape of
dynamic pricing model for sellers, which can provide the
price as (continuous) functions of the demanded quantity or
as (discrete) two-columns table: quantity and price. For the
sake of simplicity, without lack of generality, we modeled
price/quantity curves as broken lines: they are slopes till a
certain number of demanded products, then they turn into
plateau. Despite its simplicity, this model is realistic enough,
because slopes model a decrementing price strategies with
constant discount rates represented by the angular coefficients.
From a value on, slopes become plateau, modeling the
saturation effect due to the fact that selling unit price cannot
be lower than production-related costs.
Fig. 4: Price/quantity diagrams for a single product. Each line
represent the curve for a different seller. The curve defines
how the unit price changes while varying the demand.
The lowest broken line in bold red indicates the lower
envelope of DPM curves and is the unit price obtained by
the fair (all sellers), under the assumption that each seller
has infinite supply availability. Under this condition, given the
number of demanded products, all of them are available (and
bought to) a single seller. However, depending on the quantity,
the most convenient seller can vary. As for example, if the
requested quantity is in the range 1 to 5 units, the best seller
to select is A, from 5 to 13 is B, from 13 to 33 is C and
from 33 on is D, as delimited by vertical dashed segments
and indicated by black arrows in fig. 4.
It worths to note that these DPM models are independent
each other. These are completely defined by three parameters:
(i) the single-product unit price, when only one product is
demanded (close to the intercept value with y-axis), (ii) the
discount rate (the angular coefficient of the slope), (iii) the
saturation price (the height of the plateau). Values used in
tests are obtained using distributions reported in table I. For
the sake of generalization, we use generic currency units (CU)
instead of $, £, e, etc.
B. Dynamic pricing model for the whole fair
Unlike the dynamic pricing model for the single seller, the
DPM for the fair can be non-monotone. This happens because
after the most convenient seller terminates products in stock,
the system has to consider the second choice, then the second
etc. The unit price, in such a case is not anymore computed
directly on price/quantity curves but using a function of a
TABLE I: Parameter values used in simulation
DPM parameter Distribution Dist. params
single− product unit price Normal µ = 100 CU
σ = 20 CU
| discount rate | Lognormal µ = −2 CU/u
σ = 2 CU
saturation price Normal µ = 60 CU
σ = 12 CU
Realistic distribution kind and parameters for DPM for a single
seller. These may depend on the category of product and on
the elasticity of demand and supply.
weighted sum:
zpi,γ(qγ) = l

∑
σ∈Sγ
qpi,σ,γ · zpi,σ∑
σ∈Sγ
qpi,σ,γ
 (3)
In our case we used the function l(x) = x, therefore directly
the weighted sum.
In fig. 5(a) we present pricing curves obtaining aggregating
sellers with a finite supply availability, homogeneous over all
sellers. The more products are available at each seller and
the more the curve moves towards the lower right corner of
figure. Different phenomena can be explained by the mean
of (b) and (c), both obtained by (a) using different zooms.
In fig. 5(b), it is possible to recognize the same red steps
shown in fig. 5. These steps are the asymptotic diagram to
which fair-based price/quantity curves tend when the number
of products available at each seller tends to infinity. On the
other hand, in (c) it is possible to see a the price curve when
all sellers have 46 products. It is more evident that this curve
has a plateau at its minimum, which represent the optimal
aggregation range. The best fair performances are obtained
when the demand is in the range between 38 and 45 products,
which is exactly the maximum number of products available
at the best seller.
VIII. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
This paper presents a novel aggregation model for both
buyers and sellers, paving the road to new possibilities in
e-commerce scenarios.
Some features of our model come from group buying, others
from auctions systems but the resulting system lays at equally
distance from both, with the new introduction of double-side
aggregation. In systems like e-bay, prices increase due to
competing buyers in the auction, while in our system prices
become lower due to users’ cooperative aggregation. However,
in a more generic model, which includes also shipping and
auxiliary costs, prices/quantity curves are not monotonically
descent with the number of goods. This requires the solution
of an optimization problem, which is computed by the fair
manager module. The output of this algorithm is expected to
provide the minimum unit price and the optimal quantity to
be requested to each seller.
(a)
(b)
(c)
Fig. 5: Dynamic pricing model for the fair, due to sellers aggregation. Each curve shows the trend of the unit price by varying
the demanded amount. Curves are (logaritmically) parametrized depending on the number of products available at each seller
(a). The same diagram shown on the left, zoomed to better show its left-most side (b). The price curve when all sellers have
46 products (c).
Effects of elastic demand / supply models over the system
should be investigated, as well as the case of heterogeneous
availabilities at different sellers and how contrasting factors
interact each other (e.g. the best price seller for a specific
quantity may have more expensive delivery fares).
Despite this work is still preliminary, the encouraging results
stimulate further investigations on double-side aggregation
according to the fair-based model. As a future work we
consider providing sellers with suggestions for optimal selling
strategies and accepting eventual divergences they explicitly
force in the system.
ACKNOWLEDGMENT
The authors are grateful to Giampiero Tarantino and Davide
Taibi for their fruitful discussions and insightful suggestions,
and to Giuseppe Spedito for his implementation effort on
OpenCart. This work has been partially founded by 7Pixel
S.r.l..
REFERENCES
[1] R. J. Kauffman and B. Wang, “New buyers’ arrival under dynamic
pricing market microstructure: The case of group-buying discounts on
the internet,” Journal of Management Information Systems, vol. 18,
no. 2, pp. 157–188, 2001.
[2] K. S. Anand and R. Aron, “Group buying on the web: A
comparison of price-discovery mechanisms,” Management Science,
vol. 49, no. 11, pp. 1546–1562, 2003. [Online]. Available: http:
//dx.doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.49.11.1546.20582
[3] J. Chen, X. Chen, and X. Song, “Comparison of the group-buying
auction and the fixed pricing mechanism,” Decision Support Systems,
vol. 43, no. 2, pp. 445–459, 2007.
[4] J. Chen, Y. Liu, and S. Xiping, “Group-buying online auction and
optimal inventory policy in uncertain market,” Journal of Systems
Science and Systems Engineering, vol. 13, no. 2, pp. 202–218, 2004.
[5] J. Chen, R. J. Kauffman, Y. Liu, and X. Song, “Segmenting uncertain
demand in group-buying auctions,” Electronic Commerce Research and
Applications, vol. 9, no. 2, pp. 126–147, 2010.
[6] H. Sharif-Paghaleh, “Analysis of the waiting time effects on the
financial return and the order fulfillment in web-based group
buying mechanisms,” in Proceedings of the 2009 IEEE/WIC/ACM
International Joint Conference on Web Intelligence and Intelligent Agent
Technology-Volume 01. IEEE Computer Society, 2009, pp. 663–666.
[7] R. J. Kauffman and B. Wang, “Bid together, buy together: On the
efficacy of group-buying business models in internet-based selling,” pp.
99–137, 2002.
[8] M. Hyodo, T. Matsuo, and T. Ito, “An optimal coalition formation among
buyer agents based on a genetic algorithm,” in Developments in Applied
Artificial Intelligence. Springer, 2003, pp. 759–767.
[9] C. Li, K. Sycara, and A. Scheller-Wolf, “Combinatorial coalition
formation for multi-item group-buying with heterogeneous customers,”
Decision Support Systems, vol. 49, no. 1, pp. 1–13, 2010.
[10] T. Matsuo and T. Ito, “A decision support system for group buying based
on buyers’ preferences in electronic commerce,” in the proceedings of
the Eleventh World Wide Web International Conference (WWW-2002),
2002, pp. 84–89.
[11] ——, “A group formation support system based on substitute goods in
group buying,” Systems and Computers in Japan, vol. 35, no. 10, pp.
23–31, 2004.
[12] T. Matsuo, “A reassuring mechanism design for traders in electronic
group buying,” Applied Artificial Intelligence, vol. 23, no. 1, pp. 1–15,
2009.
[13] J. Yamamoto and K. Sycara, “A stable and efficient buyer coalition
formation scheme for e-marketplaces,” in Proceedings of the fifth
international conference on Autonomous agents. ACM, 2001, pp.
576–583.
[14] T. Chen, “Towards convenient customer–driven group–buying: an
intelligent centralised p2p system,” International Journal of Technology
Intelligence and Planning, vol. 8, no. 1, pp. 16–31, 2012.
[15] T. Ito, H. Hattori, and T. Shintani, “A cooperative exchanging mechanism
among seller agents for group-based sales,” Electronic Commerce
Research and Applications, vol. 1, no. 2, pp. 138–149, 2002.
[16] T. Ito, H. Ochi, and T. Shintani, “A group-buy protocol based on
coalition formation for agent-mediated e-commerce,” IJCIS, vol. 3, no. 1,
pp. 11–20, 2002.
[17] Y. K. Lee, S. W. Kim, M. J. Ko, and S. E. Park, “Pricing agents
for a group buying system,” in EurAsia-ICT 2002: Information and
Communication Technology. Springer, 2002, pp. 693–700.
[18] J.-S. Lee and K.-S. Lin, “An innovative electronic group-buying
system for mobile commerce,” Electronic Commerce Research and
Applications, vol. 12, no. 1, pp. 1–13, 2013.
[19] M. Lai and C. Su, “An empirical test of the effectiveness of
communication source: A case of group buy,” in Proceedings of the
13th Asia Pacific Management Conference, Melbourne, Australia, 2007,
pp. 1263–1269.
[20] H. Lai and Y. Zhuang, “Comparing the performance of group-buying
models with different incentive mechanisms,” in Proceedings of the
Third Workshop on e-Business, 2004, pp. 1–12.
[21] H. Lai and Y.-T. Zhuang, “Comparing the performance of group-buying
models-time based vs. quantity based extra incentives,” in Proceedings of
the Fourth Workshop on Knowledge Economy and Electronic Commerce,
2006, pp. 81–90.
[22] L. Bucci, “From e-commerce to social commerce: exploring global
trends,” 2014.
[23] “Opencart - open source shopping cart solution.”
Pierluigi Gallo has been an Assistant Professor at
the University of Palermo since November 2010. He
graduated with distinction in Electronic Engineering
in July 2002 and worked at CRES (Electronic
Research Center in Sicily) until 2009. His work
there was dedicated to QoS in IP core routers,
IPv6 network mobility and Wireless Networks. His
research activity has focused on wireless networks at
the MAC layer and 802.11 extensions, localization
based on the time of arrival and cross layer solutions.
P. Gallo has contributed to several national and
European research projects: ITEA-POLLENS (2001-2003) on a middleware
platform for a programmable router; IST ANEMONE (2006-2008) about IPv6
mobility; IST PANLAB II on the infrastructure implementation for federating
testbeds; ICT FLAVIA (2010-2013) on Flexible Architecture for Virtualizable
future wireless Internet Access; CREW (2013-2014) Cognitive Radio
Experimental World; WiSHFUL(2015-) Wireless Software and Hardware
platforms for Flexible and Unified radio and network control.
Francesco Randazzo has been a student at the
University of Palermo. He graduated with first-class
honours in Telecommunications Engineering in
March 2015 and he is working at 7Pixel S.r.l since
June 2015. His work is oriented to development of
web applications for e-commerce.
Ignazio Gallo has been an Assistant Professor at
the University of Insubria, Varese since 2003. He
received his degree in Computer Science at the
University of Milan, Italy, in 1998. His research
activity has focused on Computer Vision, Image
Processing, Pattern Recognition, Neural Computing.
